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THE CANADIAN COMPULSORY CONCILIATION LAWS
AND THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF UNION POWER
by David McCord Wright*
What shall we do about the conditions sketched in my previous paper?
The labor union today, I there submitted, is often a power which will neither
restrain itself nor allow restraint and which can and does often act in ways
contrary to the general interest. Considerations of the general welfare mean
that something must be done. Either the union power must be weakened or
its exercise must be limited. My task here is, first, to describe one of the more
promising of the regulation methods - the Canadian compulsory conciliation
approach - and next to go on to an evaluation of general principles.
In dealing with Canadian labor law, the first thing to remember is that
Canada is a far less unified country than the United States. I mean that the
Canadian provinces are far stronger than the American states, relative to the
Dominion government. Thus the range of application of federal labor law in
Canada is, from a United States point of view, extraordinarily limited. This
means that we find not one main code with a number of minor ones on the
periphery, as in the United States, but on the contrary a number of independent
major codes of nearly equal importance. One cannot therefore say that "Ca-
nadian labor law" is such and such with as much definiteness as he can that
of the United States.
Nevertheless, Canadian labor laws for the provinces and federal govern-
ment have fortunately many common basic features, especially as regards com-
pulsory conciliation. I shall not, therefore, attempt detailed dissection of pro-
vincial codes. Instead a general bibliography is annexed to this paper which
will serve as an introduction to the subject for those who wish to go further.'
What I shall do here is to describe what might be called the typical Canadian
procedure - albeit every province has its own version.
Canada has taken over from the United States much of the "certification"
procedure regarding unions. In addition, the compulsory conciliation statutes
only apply to designated groups - to, for example, "employees." Some com-
plicated questions of applicability can arise in this connection. Thus, in the
recent strike of the French language television producers of the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation which by-passed the conciliation machinery, CBC
argued that the strike was illegal because the "producers" were employees
and hence covered by the compulsory conciliation acts. The producers, on the
other hand, argued that they were "management" and hence not covered. The
arbitrator, H. D. Woods, ruled for the producers. But once bargaining began,
the parties reversed themselves, CBC maintaining that producers were manage-
ment and hence should not be unionized and the producers arguing that they
were employees!
Supposing, however, that the parties are covered by the labor laws; then
before a legal strike can be called notice must be given to the conciliation
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authorities, provincial or federal, as the case may be. Each province and the
federal government maintains a conciliation service. Upon notice of a claim
and dispute, the conciliation officer interviews the parties and attempts to
bring them together. Supposing him to have failed to compose the dispute, an
arbitration - or more accurately conciliation or investigation - board is se-
lected. One man is usually nominated by the union, one by the employer, a
third by agreement of the first two, or by appointment by the conciliation
service, in case there is disagreement. I am by-passing a mass of detail here
(see bibliography below) to get at the main points.
Once the conciliation board has been selected, it proceeds to hold hear-
ings and collect data much as an arbitration board in the United States would
do. There are, however, two unique features in the Canadian machinery. First,
if the board cannot obtain sufficient data in the statutory period, it may post-
pone a decision, and the strike cannot legally be called until the board finally
renders a verdict. Secondly, the board does not merely report failure, or "find"
facts. Supposing its conciliation efforts to have failed, it is then required to
go further and outline what it considers a fair settlement of the dispute. In other
words, under the law, what is to all intents and purposes an arbitration award
precedes a strike or lockout. After such a report, the party which neverthe-
less calls a strike or lockout is under the disadvantage of having rejected a
careful, presumably impartial, report on the dispute.
Had the Canadian procedure been in force during our recent steel strike,
things would have gone as follows: Mr. McDonald and the steel companies
would first have notified a conciliation officer. If he failed, then a conciliation
board would have been appointed in the manner described. The Steelworkers
would not have been able to call a legal strike until the board felt itself able
to render a decision. Then a complete report and award would have been
made, and only if the union had still been dissatisfied, and in the face of the
report, could a strike have been called. Obviously a very considerable change
in tactics would have been involved.
How have the Canadian schemes worked? Here one will find almost
as many opinions as there are people asked. Let us therefore first consider the
record. It has been informally estimated that for the total coverage, provincial
and federal, some 70 per cent of labor-management disputes get settled be-
fore they reach the strike stage. On the other hand, when a strike does occur,
Canadian strikes tend to be longer and more bitter than American. Of course
I speak only generally and on balance.
Now, as to opinions: Labor experts often complain that the cooling off
period of the conciliation is really a heating-up period. Bargaining, they say,
is not really seriously undertaken. The unions also complain that the concilia-
tion machinery puts them at a disadvantage. Some people dislike the inter-
ference with "freedom." On the other hand the facts would seem to be clear
that the conciliation requirements do avoid a large proportion of minor strikes,
sometimes even ones that could be very serious. Thus the laws have been
helpful. But on the other hand the Canadian laws are not "the" answer to
the labor problem any more than any other set of laws, where really deep
splits of opinion exist. Thus where the union is determined to press for higher
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wages, or to maintain old work rules, no matter what, and the employers
think they cannot meet the demand, the familiar stalemate appears. This oc-
curred in the Canadian Pacific Railroad strike, concerning the use of firemen
on diesel engines. But at least the party there resorting to force did so'in the
teeth of a fair investigation. This puts the onus on the actor, and I think it
is a fair requirement.
Yet, since we see that even this method, had it been applied say to the
United States steel strike, would probably not have avoided the prolonged strike
which occurred - it might have, but not necessarily so - the question again
arises: What can be done about the problem of labor power? The public
interest, I submit, definitely requires that we cannot just leave it alone. The
matter has become too important.
Many people will suggest the use of compulsory arbitration - not just
of an infrequent or emergency type apparently envisaged by Professor Cox,
but a definite system of labor courts on the Australian model - in which it
is thought the public interest will find definite, dignified and continuous ex-
pression. Unfortunately, the problem is not that simple. The basic objection
goes back to our analysis of the general working of the pricing system and the
pushes and pulls of differential reward. We may settle a strike in plant "A"
by a wage settlement that looks "fair" between the two immediate parties -
only to find that in so doing we have upset the whole structure of relative
wages and precipitated strikes in "B," "C" and "D." The economic system
is so interrelated that it is virtually impossible to "settle" one part of it with-
out affecting others. By the time alt the issues have been considered - suppos-
ing they are - the arbitrator will have left behind settling that dispute and
be busily engaged in planning the general economic system. For example, it
would be tacitly up to such a system of labor courts to determine the domestic
price level!
One immediate result of the general economic problem involved is that
responsible arbitration boards will be extremely slow to render verdicts. In
practice, a dispute is often no more than "settled" before it is begun again,
for the basis of the settlement is then out of date.
But I submit that the basic superstition underlying the compulsory arbi-
tration system is the idea that because the verdict is rendered by a public body
it will necessarily reflect the public interest. This is naive. An arbitration court
can make just as bad a settlement, economically, as any pair of private bar-
gainers. All sorts of trading, lobbying, and so on are possible. Finally, compul-
sory arbitration need not really always get the men back to work. There is such
a thing as the slow down - that most difficult of situations to handle. In short,
a system of compulsory arbitration and labor courts becomes in practice an
obfuscation office and can be just as inflationary and short-sighted as private
bargaining; and, more than anything else, compulsory arbitration creates an
enormously strong pressure toward a system of general economic planning
and a most serious obstacle to quick, effective management and modernization.
My feeling, therefore, is that we should think more in the direction of
reducing union power and putting wage bargains in the context of the pricing
system. Professor Cox has sketched certain "emergency" procedures, but these,
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I submit, in the frame of the preconceptions in which they are presented, would
have strong pressures to develop toward an Australian-type system, which does
not seem to me desirable. But Professor Cox raises a much more fundamental
issue. He apparently assumes that we cannot limit union power at all with-
out destroying unions. I may be putting it too strongly. His point, as I under-
stand it, is rather that if we apply the theoretical standards of pure and perfect
competition to the unions we would destroy them. Now this second statement
is quite right. But I have also argued2 that if we apply the standards of pure
and perfect competition to the corporations we would destroy them. In fact,
the ultimate paradox is that if we applied the theoretical standards of pure
and perfect competition to the dynamic pricing system we would destroy it!
So let us forget these static equilibrium models and talk about something rele-
vant.
How do economists who believe in the competitive system and also in
some type of unionism fit unions into the picture? The idea, as I see it, is that
in the ordinary, freely-but-imperfectly competitive system, the rate of increase
in real wages made possible by capital formation and pioneering management
might still lag somewhat because of the bargaining advantage of the employer,
and simple inertia. Economists, therefore, who accept "business unionism"
would want a movement strong enough to give labor a fair share of the grow-
ing total and no stronger. In the same way, so far as the issue of "fairness"
in promotion goes, one would want a union strong enough to protect against
unfair discrimination between individuals by the corporation; but one must
not forget that there also can be unfair discrimination and coercion of the em-
ployee by the union leadership.
Now my standards are no more than a first approximation and need de
tailed implementation without doubt. Yet I submit that there is clearly an area
of action here in which we can explore limiting extremes of union power with.
out eliminating unions. Professor Cox in effect has fallen into that fallacy of
the excluded middle so brilliantly satirized by Mr. Thurber in "You can fool
too many of the people too much of the time." I cannot in this paper do more
than indicate an approach. My suggested attitude does not involve gratuitous
union baiting. It does imply that we face the problem of excessive power, that
we deflate our absurdly over-expanded ideas of the net beneficence of unions,
and that we ask what can be done about them. Perhaps half the battle will
be gained when the public gets over its starry-eyed view of the unions as neces-
sarily altruistic forces for equality and progress, and sees them for what they
are - often reactionary agencies of personal privilege.
2 See, e.g., 37 VA. L. REv. 1333 (1951).
